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In the Supreme Court 
olthe Stale ol Utah 
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT A. ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8970 
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the 
court below. All emphasis by the Appellant. 
This action was initially commenced in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, where the court sitting without al 
jury, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant 
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appealed to the District Court, where at pretrial, summary 
judgments were given to the defendant on plaintiff's com-
plaint and to the plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim. 
Plaintiff's subsequent motion to amend findings of fact, 
vacate the judgment and for new trial, was denied. The 
plaintiff appeals frdm the denial of said motion and from 
the district court's summary judgment for the defendant 
on plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the court below rendered a summary judgment 
adverse to plaintiff, he is entitled to have the facts viewed 
in the light most favorable to him in this appeal. ( Abdulka-
dir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 7 Ut., (2d) 53, 318 Pac. 
(2d) 339). Appellant's evidence would establish the facts to 
be as follo-ws: 
The two-car accident took place at the "T" intersec-
tion of 5th South and University Streets, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on March 6, 1957 at approximately 8:00 a.m. Fifth 
South at this point is a through highway, designated as 
U. S. 40, and is 88 feet wide with three lanes of traffic in 
each direction, separated by a concrete island. (R. 5, 6, 
diagram). The inside west-bound lane was 10 feet wide, 
the center west-bound lane was 10 feet wide, and the out-
side west-bound lane was 23 feet wide. (Diagram). The 
posted speed limit on Fifth South at the point of collision 
was 40 miles per hour. (R. 7). University Street is 23 feet 
wide and has a stop sign facing north. (R. 5, diagram). 
The morning of the accident, the weather was overcast, 
and it had been raining, but at the time of the collision 
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there was no precipitation. 
Plaintiff was proceeding west on Fifth South on the 
inside lane at 15 miles per hour approaching the inter-
section of University Street. (R.l5,plaintiff's affidavit). The 
center and outside west bound traffic lanes were well filled 
with other moving vehicles, which completely blocked 
plaintiff's view as to any traffic proceeding onto Fifth South 
from University Street. (Plaintiff's affidavit). The defend-
ant stopped at the stop sign on University Street and pro-
ceeded south onto Fifth South in front of moving west-
bound traffic in the center and outside lanes of traffic, 
attaining a speed of five to ten miles per hour. (R. 5, 7). 
Defendant intended to make a left turn around the divid-
ing island and proceed east on Fifth South. (The defendant 
entered the intersection prior to the entrance of the plain-
tiff into the intersection proper. (R. 7). 
The plaintiff first noted the sudden appearance of the 
defendant's car just a few feet in front of him in plain-
tiff's lane of traffic and plaintiff immediately applied his 
brakes. At about the same instant the defendant saw plain-
tiff and attempted to stop. (R. 5, 7, plaintiff's affidavit). 
The two cars collided at a point five feet south of the line 
separating the inside and center west-bound traffic lanes 
and ten feet west of an extension of the east border of 
University Street where it intersects Fifth South. (R. 5, 
diagram). There were no visible skid marks on the road. 
(Diagram). The vehicles moved approximately two feet 
southwest after impact. (Plaintiff's affidavit). A Salt Lake 
Police Officer investigated the accident and prepared a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
diagram of the scene of the accident. (Diagram). Imme-
diately after the collision the defendant stated to the 
plaintiff, "I am sorry, it appears to have been my fault." 
(Plaintif's affidavit, R. 8). 
It should be noted that there is no evidence before 
the court regarding the following relevant and material 
facts: The relative positions and speed of other traffic in 
the vicinity of the accident just prior to the accident; the 
condition of the brakes and windshields on the two ve-
hicles involved; the exact time of and type of brake ap-
plication by the parties; more exact physical circumstances 
bearing on the ability of either party to see one another 
prior to the time that each of them actually saw one 
another; familiarity of the parties with the intersection; 
how long defendant was stopped prior to moving onto 
Fifth South Street; exact position of the stop sign; po-
sition of the defendant when stopped at the stop sign; the 
time differential between the parties in entering the inter-
section; the speed and movement of the defendant in cross-
ing Fifth South prior to the collision; the n1ovement of 
west-bound traffic abreast of the plaintiff relative to the 
movement of the parties; the full testimony of both parties, 
one eye-witness and the investigating police officer. All 
of this could and should be supplied, and it is the conten-
tion of appellant that if all of the available evidence were 
presented, there would be questions of fact to be deter-
mined by a jury. On the record before the trial court, the 
rights of the parties cannot be determined as a matter of 
I a w. 
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STATEMENT OF POINT TO BE RELIED UPON 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BE-
FOR THE LOWER COURT TO RULE THAT THE 
PLAINTIFlF, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE, OR THAT ANY SUCH ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
PLAINTIFlF'S DAMAGE. 
ARGUMENT 
Construing the evidence and inferences therefrom 
most favorably to the plaintiff, as this court is bound to 
do, the situation may be viewed as follows: 
The plaintiff, proceeding west on Fifth South, was 
reducing his speed and going at the rate of 15 miles per 
hour in approaching the intersection at University Street. 
The defendant, without warning, going at the rate of 10 
miles per hour, suddenly appeared in front of the plaintiff 
from in front of traffic to the right of the plaintiff which 
completely obstructed plaintiff's view. (Plaintiff's affi-
davit). The defendant had stopped at the stop sign on 
University Street and waited for a period of time that 
caused him to become impatient for the crowded west-
bound traffic to give him an opening to cut across the six 
lane through highway. Finding a slight break in the west-
bound traffic, the defendant seized the opportunity, and 
drove out onto Fifth South, although he could not see, or 
failed to see, the traffic approaching on the inside west-
bound lane on which plaintiff was slowly proceeding. It 
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may be also assumed, upon the the basis of plaintiff's 
proposed testimony, that the west-bound traffic to the 
right of the plaintiff was proceeding at such a speed, and 
in such relative positions that said traffic was able to 
have advance warning of the movement of the defendant, 
and therefore avoid collision with the defendant. (Plain-
tiff's affidavit). It is not disputed that the defendant was 
negligent. In summary, plaintiff alleges that in addition 
to the stipulated facts, a full presentation of the evidence 
would disclose other facts, presenting a total picture 
from which a jury could conclude that: 
1. The defendant should have seen the plaintiff prior 
to the time the defendant actually did so and yielded the 
right of way to the plaintiff. 
2. The plaintiff had no reason or opportunity to anti-
cipate the presence of the defendant before the plaintiff 
actually did so. 
3. Under all the circumstances the plaintiff was not 
negligent and the sole proximate cause of the accident 
was the defendant's negligence. 
The sole question before this court is as to whether, 
as a matter of law, the plaintiff was negligent, and if any 
such alleged negligence was the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's damage. 
The question in,·olves Section 41-6-74, U.C.A. 
1953, which peovides: 
"Vehicle entering a through highway. The 
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this 
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act at the entrance to a through highway and shall 
yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have 
entered the intersection from said through highway 
or which are approaching so closely on said through 
highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but 
said driver having so yielded may proceed and the 
drivers of all other vehicles approaching the inter-
section on said through highway shall yield the 
right-of-way to the vehicle so proceeding into or 
across the through highway. 
"(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop 
in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at 
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one 
or more entrances thereto although not a part of 
a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, 
yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which 
are within the intersection or approaching so close-
ly as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may 
then proceed." 
The lower court apparently based its Summary 
Judgment primarily upon the case of Smith vs. Lenzi, 74 
Ut. 362, 279 Pac. 893. The facts of that case are distinguish-
able. It did not involve obstructions to the vision of the 
two involved drivers, occurred on a dark night, involved 
a much different type of intersection, and different move-
ments by the parties prior to the collision. In that case, 
the lower court entered judgment based on a jury verdict 
for the motorist proceeding on the through street. This 
court reversed the lower court on the grounds that the 
jury failed to receive proper instructions on the relative 
rights of the involved motorists. This court then proceeded 
not to rule on the liability as a matter of law, but rather 
to instruct the lower court on the proper applicable law 
at 279 Pac. 895, 896, as follows: 
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"If the respondent (approaching the through 
street) stopped immediately before entering High-
land Drive, he complied with all the requirements 
of the ordinance. From that moment he was free 
to move without restriction, so far as the ordinance 
is concerned. As he approached Highland Drive 
after stopping, the statute gave him the right-of-
way as against automobiles coming in the direction 
the respondent was traveling, and made it the duty 
of such persons approaching from the left to yield 
the right-of-way. But these rights and duties were 
only relative, and must be applied in the light of 
the conditions existing at the time. Aside from any 
statute or ordinance, it was the duty of both parties 
to use such caution as a reasonably prudent person 
would have done in entering the intersection. The 
speed that the cars were approaching, their distance 
from the point of intersection, the ability of the 
respective drivers to see were all factors to be con-
sidered by the jury in determining whether appel-
ant or respondent was entitled to the right-of-way. 
" ... When a person stops immediately before 
entering an arterial highway, he will necessarily 
enter the intersection more slowly. The rate that 
he is moving, the speed of the arterial traffic, and 
its frequence, together with any other surrounding 
circumstances, must all be considered, together 
with the statute giving to the person approaching 
from the right the right-of-way in determining 
whether at a given instance he should enter the 
stream of traffic." 
The holding and dicta of Smith vs. Lenzi, as applied 
to the instant case require only that a court properly 
instruct a jury on the statutory law, in order that the jury 
may apply said law in the full light of the existing con-
ditions. The plaintiff seeks nothing more than this. In the 
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the pretrial, nor the additional facts alleged by the plain-
tiff, will justify a finding that as a matter of law the 
plaintiff was negligent or that any such alleged negligence 
was the proximate cause of his damage. It may be noted 
that whatever support the defendant's position may receive 
from the Smith case is challenged in a vigorous dissent by 
two of the justices in that case, and in the more recent 
holdings of this court as reflected in intersection cases 
hereinafter cited. 
In Williams vs. Z.C.M.I., 312 Pac. (2d) 564, this court 
commented upon the statute involved in the instant case 
as follows: 
"The statute requires the driver entering a 
through highway to yield the right of way to other 
vehicles which have entered into the intersection 
from the through highway or which are approach-
ing so closely on said through highway as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard. 
({A fact question was presented as to whether 
defendant entered the intersection when plaintiff 
was approaching so closely on said through high-
way as to constitute an immediate hazard. The 
further fact question was presented, as to whether 
defendant had entered the intersection under such 
circumstances as to impose on plaintiff the duty 
of yielding the right-of-way." 
Construing the stipulated and alleged facts most fav-
orably to the plaintiff in the instant case, an obvious fact 
question is presented as to whether the plaintiff was ap-
proaching so closely to the intersection as to constitute an 
immediate hazard to the defendant. 
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Regarding the question of determining contributory 
negligence this court stated in Martin vs. Stevens, 243 
Pac. (2d) 741, at pages 749-50: 
"The question of contributory negligence is 
usually for the jury and the court should be reluct-
ant to take consideration of this question of fact 
from it. * * * The right to trial by jury should be 
safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory negli-
gence may be taken from the jury, the defendant's 
burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence, and (b) that such neg-
ligence proximately contributed to cause his own 
injury, must be met, and established with such 
certainty that reasonable minds could not find to 
the contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable 
basis, eitheT because of lack of evidence, or from 
the evidence and the fair inferences arising there-
from, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
upon which reasonable minds 1nay conclude that 
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence either (aj) that plaintit,f was guilty of con-
tributory negligence or (b) that such negligence 
proximately contributed to cause the injury, the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted 
to a jury. 
"* * *An excellent text statement of the rights 
and duties of drivers at intersections is contained 
in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Perm. Ed. § 991 to 994 incl. pp. 206 et 
seq. The first of these rules is that the vehicle 
which enters the crossing first has the right-of-way 
over a second one con1ing from another direction, 
unless under the standard of due care, he should 
not proceed because to do so would hazard a collis-
ion. In close cases, this test is somewhat unsatis-
factory because of the difficulties, after a collision 
has occurred, of detern1ining who had the right-of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
way on that basis. The text just referred to correct-
ly states: '* * * The mere fact of reaching the inter-
section first is no longer recognized as the sole 
test as to who has the right of way. In order for 
a driver to claim the right of way on the basis of 
entering the intersection first, it must appear that 
he did not speed up just for the purpose of claim-
ing the right of way, and also that the margin or dis-
tance by which he claimed it was so clear as to be 
without doubt.' " 
The court also quoted with approval the following 
language of Justice Wolfe from Bullock vs. Luke, 98 U. 
501, 98 Pac. (2d) 350, 354: 
"* * * we must be careful not to stretch con-
tributory negligence to the point where we make 
it incumbent upon one not only to drive carefully 
himself, but to drive so carefully as always to be 
prepared for some sudden burst of negligence of 
another and be able to avoid it. * * *" 
The lower court in the instant case has evidenced 
not the slightest inclination to be "reluctant" to take 
contributory negligence from a jury or to avoid "stretch 
ing" said doctrine. 
The citing of additional similar cases with varying 
fact situations would be of little help to this court. 
A summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings 
and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled as 
a matter of law to such judgment. (U.R.C.P. 56 C; Martin 
vs. Stevens, supra; Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Rail-
road Co., supra). The fact that the history of this case 
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shows that one judge hearing fully the case without a 
jury found for the plaintiff, and that a second judge, 
viewing only a part of the facts and allegations, summarily 
reached a contrary result, strongly indicates that this case 
is one upon which reasonable men may differ as to any 
negligence on the part of plaintiff and the proximate 
causes of the collision. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent decisions of this court clearly hold that in 
nearly all intersection cases the question of defendant's 
negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence are for 
the jury. Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Ut. 60, 163 Pac. (2d) 510; 
Lowder vs. Holley, 120 Ut. 231, 233 Pac. (2d) 350; Poulsen 
vs. Mannes, 121 Ut. 269, 241, Pac. (2d) 152; Martin vs. 
Stephens, supra; Kalaher vs. Brown, 6 Ut. (2d) 346, 313 
Pac. (2d) 804. 
The summary judgment for the defendant should be 
reversed and a new trial ordeTed in plaintiff's cause of 
action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
& JAY E. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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